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Introduction
Toward the end of 2017, the outstanding balance of Chi-
nese local governments’ debt was RMB 16.47 trillion. By 
the end of 2018, the total debt of local governments in 
China reached RMB 18.4 trillion, which is approached 
the ceiling of RMB 18.82 trillion of local governments’ 
debt approved by the National People’s Congress in 2017. 
However, the debt ratio (the ratio of the debt to GDP) is 
lower than the internationally accepted 100–120% warn-
ing line. Considering the hidden debts of local regions, 
local debts have potential risks. The rapid growth of cit-
ies’ debt is derived from China’s unique land finance (tudi 
caizheng), that is, to expand cities’ revenue by land lease, 
land mortgage loans, and bonds (Wu et al., 2015; Cheng 
et al., 2018; Gao et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019b).
In 1994, the central and local governments implement-
ed the tax-sharing system (fenshuizhi). The liabilities and 
responsibilities of urban development were decentralized, 
while the power of tax revenue collection was recentral-
ized (Mello, 2000; Liu & Lin, 2014; Cao et al., 2019). Lo-
cal governments’ tax revenue depleted and needed new 
funds sources to promote cities’ economic development 
plans (Ho & Lin, 2003; Cai et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019a; 
Narbón-Perpiñá et al., 2020). Meanwhile, the land bank 
system and bidding, auction, and transferring methods 
were established in the form of laws and regulations. 
Land became an important source of income and high-
quality financing collateral for local governments. Urban 
land supply is monopolized by local governments through 
bidding, auction, and listing system. With the land trans-
ferring, the revenue is distributed between the central 
and local governments. Local governments would dom-
inate over 90% of the earnings. Local governments can 
obtain financial resources through three means, namely, 
land-leasing revenue, land loans, and urban investment 
bonds (chengtouzhai) (Tsui, 2011; Wang et  al., 2018). 
2003 to 2015 was the critical period of Chinese urbani-
zation development. Local governments require substan-
tial funds to construct urban infrastructure. Only 10% 
of the local governments’ total investment in infrastruc-
ture comes from the fiscal budget; the remaining 90% is 
provided by land-leasing revenue and urban investment 
bonds (Wen et al., 2018). Local governments issue urban 
investment bonds to finance urban infrastructure con-
struction. Land-leasing revenue must be repaid when the 
bonds are due. According to National Development and 
Research Center report, from 1999–2003, total investment 
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Abstract. This study first analyzes how local governments’ land-leasing behaviors affect Chinese cities’ debt risk then ex-
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behavior is reflected through three indicators, namely, land-leasing revenue, land-leasing scale, and land financial de-
pendence level. Two new indicators are constructed to measure the local government’ debt risk from the perspective of 
debt scale and debt repayment: the debt scale risk and debt burden risk. Empirical analyses are based on the data of 281 
prefecture-level cities from 2006–2015. The main findings are twofold. First, the debt scale risk is positively affected by the 
land-leasing revenue, and officials’ promotion pressure. The debt burden risk is positively affected by the land financial 
dependence and officials’ promotion pressure. Second, the officials’ promotion pressure significantly enhances the positive 
effect of land-leasing revenue on the debt scale risk. Local officials, who are under promotion pressure, are inclined to ex-
pand the size of urban investment bonds, which increases debt scale risk.
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of the infrastructure construction of local governments 
was RMB 232.27 billion, of which the land-leasing rev-
enue was RMB 33.75 billion, which accounted for 14.3%, 
land mortgage loans and urban investment bonds reached 
RMB 170 billion, which accounted for 72.88%. Analyz-
ing China’s land-driven infrastructure construction mode 
reveals that land has become a tool for local governments 
to profit and leverage for financing (Zheng et  al., 2014; 
Zhang et al., 2017; Xu, 2019).
Land-leasing revenue is the source for local govern-
ments to address the debt repayment risk. According to 
the data released by the National Audit Office in 2013, the 
proportion of Chinese cities’ debt committed to repay by 
land-leasing revenue reached 54.6% in 2012. A total of 
80% of the local governments promised to repay over 30% 
of the debt by land-leasing revenue. It points out that two 
opposing views exist on the effect on the total amount of 
bonds (city’s bonds issued scale). One is the land-leasing 
revenues and debt financing, which are important sources 
of funding municipal infrastructure construction, when 
land-leasing revenues rise; local governments will reduce 
the need for debt financing (Homburg, 2014; Wu et  al., 
2016b; Huang & Chan, 2018). The second view is that 
when land-leasing revenues increase, local governments 
may overestimate the expected solvency, which will in-
crease the issued scales of urban investment bonds. Land-
leasing behavior directly affects the risk of local govern-
ments’ debt, and studying the mechanism and risk of land 
financing is necessary.
In addition to being affected by the land-leasing be-
havior, Chinese cities’ debt risk is related to the promotion 
pressure of local officials. The promotion opportunities of 
local officials are basing on economic indicators, which 
include the construction of local infrastructure and eco-
nomic development (Li & Zhou, 2015; Wu et al., 2016a; 
Lu et  al., 2019; Huang et  al., 2020). Under the pressure 
of performance evaluation, local officials are inclined to 
issue bonds to support urban development. Investing in 
the infrastructure and urban development can increase 
the cities’ GDP so officials can gain greater promotion op-
portunities. Therefore, the officials’ promotion pressure is 
related to Chinese cities’ debt risk (Cai et al., 2011). Previ-
ous studies on political cycles pointed out that the local of-
ficial’s promotion pressure varies at different stages of their 
career (Guo, 2009). The closer they are to retirement the 
greater promotion pressure they have, and the high likeli-
ness of issuing bonds to develop the local economy. More-
over, the competition between local governments caused 
by the promotion pressure has also increased the issued 
scale of local governments’ debt, which will increase the 
debt risk (Wang & Hui, 2017).
Since April 2008, three urban investment bonds over-
due payment has occurred when the bonds are expired 
(Qian, 2018). With the default of some urban invest-
ment bonds, regulators have been increasingly focusing 
on Chinese cities’ debt risk. Existing studies mainly mea-
sure the local debt risk through the debt scale. However, 
we find the debt scale of the cities with default of urban 
investment bonds is not large，For example, the urban 
investment bonds in Yiyang and Huhhot cities. Yiyang is 
a municipal city in Hunan province, and Huhhot is the 
capital city of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in 
China. The urban investment bonds defaulted in 2018, 
because the government didn’t have enough funds to pay 
the remaining principle of RMB 640 million. The urban 
investment bonds in Huhhot city defaulted twice, in 2019 
and 2012, respectively. Compared to the coastal cities of 
East China, the debt scale of Yiyang and Huhhot is not 
large. From the perspective of government investment and 
asset accumulation, not all local government’ debt created 
equal (Peppel-Srebrny, 2021). The local government 
debt in different cities has different effect on the city’s 
infrastructure construction and economic growth, which 
results in the cities’ different repayment ability. Therefore, 
the local government’s debt risk mainly depends on the 
city’s debt repayment ability.
This study aims to find the relationship of local gov-
ernments’ land-leasing behavior, local cities’ debt risk and 
officials’ promotion pressure. Land-leasing behavior is 
measured by three indicators, namely, land-leasing rev-
enue, land-leasing scale, and land financial dependence. 
To analyze the effect of land-leasing behavior and officials’ 
promotion pressure on the local governments’ debt risk. 
We need to measure the local governments’ debt risk ac-
curately and reasonably. The local government’ debt risk 
is measured from the respects of the debt scale and the 
debt repayment, and two new indicators: debt scale risk 
and debt burden risk are constructed. Promotion pres-
sures are measured according to the municipal officials’ 
age. Officials with ages between 55–58 years old are at 
the last tenure term and have greater promotion pressure. 
They are more probable to issue urban investment bonds 
to stimulate the local economy than younger officials.
Compared with the existing research, this study has 
two contributions. First, this study subdivides the local 
governments’ debt risk into debt scale risk and debt bur-
den risk, and first quantifies the risk of urban investment 
bonds from the point of local governments’ debt repay-
ment ability. The two indicators can assess the risk of ur-
ban investment bonds systematically, and the debt burden 
risk is more accurate to measure the local governments’ 
debt risk. Existing studies are mainly on the debt scale, 
and few are quantitative studies on the debt risk of urban 
investment bonds. Second, this study analyzes the impact 
of officials’ promotion pressure on the local governments’ 
debt risk. The promotion of Chinese officials implements 
top-down mechanism. Cities officials’ career is predicted 
on fulfilling a range of mandates and satisfying their su-
periors (Pan et al., 2017). Generally, officials with shorter 
tenures are more incentivized to promote economic per-
formance due to their larger probability to be promoted 
than leaders with longer tenures. Therefore, officials at the 
age of 55–60 have the greatest promotion pressure, and 
the inter-jurisdictional competition could be a driving 
force for the excessive borrowing by local governments, 
which requires the local governments obtain large scale 
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land-leasing revenue to repay debt (Baldacci et al., 2011; 
Pan et al., 2017; Popescu & Turcu, 2017). Therefore, local 
governments’ land financing has been caught in a vicious 
circle. This study assesses how officials’ promotion pres-
sure impacts on local governments’ debt risk through the 
land-leasing behavior.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. The 
next section introduces the spatial and temporal distribu-
tion of local governments’ debt in China. The second sec-
tion is the data and variables. The third section presents 
econometric models. The fourth section presents the em-
pirical results, and last section is the conclusions.
1. Spatial and temporal distribution of local  
debt risk
1.1. Local government debt distribution
According to the No. 32 announcement of The Audit Com-
mission, toward the end of June 2013, the total debt of the 
national government was RMB 30.27 trillion. Compared 
with 2010, and 2012, it grew by 73.27% and 9.02%, re-
spectively. After the tax-sharing reforms in 1994 and 2002, 
more fiscal revenue had been diverted from the local to the 
central government, and in return local governments have 
been entitled to obtain revenue from urban land leasehold. 
State-owned enterprises are established as local financing 
platforms (LFPs). LFPs have been persistently responsible 
for financing local governments. The debt financing mode 
of local governments is popular. Since 2005, LFPs have 
been established at the provincial, prefecture-level cities, 
and counties. By the end of March 2019, only 2,264 of 
the 1,002 LFPs are provincial credits (including provin-
cial capitals and single-city municipalities), accounting 
for less than 20%, while the prefecture-level cities’ credit 
accounted for about 56%, and over 20% was county-level 
credit. Zhejiang Province ranked first with 1,490 financ-
ing platforms, followed by Sichuan Province with 780, and 
Jiangsu Province and Guangdong Province ranked third 
and fourth with 750 and 710, respectively.
LFPs obtain funds from the market mainly through 
three means: land mortgage loans, urban investment 
bonds, and capital market financing, such as financial leas-
ing and trust private placement. Urban investment bonds 
account for the largest proportion of these three financing 
means, and data on urban investment bonds are publicly 
available (Wang et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2016).
This study uses urban investment bonds to represent 
local governments’ debt. Data comes from the China 
Wind Database. Figure 1 shows the number and sizes of 
urban investment bonds issued during 2005–2019; data 
comes from the China Wind Database. Until 2011 the 
number of bonds issued by local governments is not be-
yond 30, the total amount of issued bonds were lower 
than RMB 450 billion. From 2008–2012, the amount of 
local governments’ debt had been kept steady growth, 
but the growth rate was low. Since 2012, the number 
and the total amount of urban investment bonds issued 
have shown a substantial rise. In 2014 the national to-
tal amount of Chinese cities’ debts was over one trillion 
RMB. From 2014–2018, the number and amount of local 
governments’ debt issued across the country had shown 
two drops in 2015 and 2017, but the total amount of local 
governments’ debt had still been maintained at over one 
trillion RMB. The total amount in 2016 and 2018 even 
reached RMB 2 trillion, which shows that the scale of 
local governments’ debt in China is sizeable. If including 
other hidden debts of local governments, the total debt 
has reached a high level. To promote stable economic 
development, focusing on the research of local govern-
ments’ debt risk is important (Mendonça & Nunes, 2011; 
Tsui, 2011; Tu & Padovani, 2018).
1.2. Local government debt risk measure and 
distribution
The local governments’ debt risk is affected by the utiliza-
tion efficiency and sustainability of fiscal revenues (Selow, 
1997). Some researches proposed a fiscal risk matrix to 
quantify the risk of local governments’ debts. In addition, 
debts sensitivity to the fiscal conditions, fiscal short-term 
repayment ability, unreasonable debt ratio and other in-
dicators are used to measure local governments’ debt risk. 
Baldacci et al. (2011) proposed two indicators of debt bur-
den ratio and comprehensive burden ratio to measure the 
fiscal risk. The debt burden ratio is the proportion of city’s 
debt amount to its GDP, which applies the amount of city’s 
debt and GDP to reflect the degree of the debt risk, the 
higher the debt burden ratio, the greater the city’s debt 
risk. However, the local governments’ expected repayment 
ability depends on its fiscal revenue, not GDP, so the ratio 
of local debt amount to local fiscal revenue is included to 
reflect the local debt burden level.
This study presents two indicators: debt scale risk and 
debt burden risk to measure local governments’ debt risk.
Debt scale risk:
debt scale risk = debt(1 + rd)t / gdp / (1 + rg)t. (1)
The debt represents the total amount of the city’s debt 
per year, and gdp is the city’s annual GDP, rd represents the 
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Notes: Data on urban investment bonds are collected from China WIND 
Database.
Figure 1. Amount of China’s Urban Investment Bonds issued 
during 2005–2019
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annual growth rate of the city’s urban investment bonds, 
rg represents the annual nominal gdp growth rate, and t 
represents the time (year).
Debt burden risk: 
debt burden risk = debt(1 + rd)t / revenue (1 + rfr)t. (2)
The debt represents the total amount of the city’s debt 
per year, revenue is the city’s annual revenue, rd represents 
the annual growth rate of the city’s urban investment 
bonds, rfr represents the annual growth rate of the city’s 
annual fiscal revenue, and t represents the time.
Debt scale risk reflects the debt size and is used to 
the debt risk comparison between different cities. Debt 
burden risk is focused on the city’s repayment ability and 
debt burden ratio, which is measured by the ratio of the 
city’s annual debt amount to the city’s annual fiscal rev-
enue (Gao, 2019). Given that the city’s fiscal revenue is the 
main resource to repay the city’s debt, the debt burden risk 
reflects the city’s debt risk, the higher value the indicator 
has the greater risk the city’s debt has.
To better reflect the debt risk’ changes with space 
and time, the prefecture-level cities’ burden risk values 
are calculated on the basis of the data from 2006–2015 
(Cao et al., 2014; Mao & Huang, 2018). Figures 2 and 3 
are the spatial distribution of cities’ debt burden risk in 
2009 and 2015, respectively. Comparing the two figures, 
it shows that the debt burden level of prefecture-level cit-
ies increases sharply from 2009 to 2015, especially in the 
central and eastern regions. The overall debt issuing prob-
ability and the debt scale increased. The reason is urban 
investment bonds are mainly used to urban development 
and infrastructure construction. The economy in the cen-
tral and eastern regions is better than the economy in the 
western regions so they are more inclined to issue bonds 
to develop local economy and improve infrastructure con-
struction.
2. Research ideas and data
2.1. Research ideas
Land-leasing behavior is reflected by three indicators: 
land-leasing revenue, land-leasing scale, and land finan-
cial dependence. This study first analyzes how these three 
indicators and the officials’ promotion pressure affect the 
local governments’ debt risk by taking these three indica-
tors and the officials’ promotion pressure as explanatory 
variables to construct the first econometric model to con-
duct the empirical study. Then we consider the effects of 
the officials’ promotion pressure on the local governments’ 
debt risk through the land-leasing behavior and analyze 
whether the officials’ promotion pressure enlarge the ef-
fects of land-leasing behavior to the local governments’ 
debt risk. Thus, the interactive variables of the land trans-
fer behavior and officials’ promotion pressure are added 
to the econometric model to construct the second econo-
metric model.
2.2. Data description
We construct a prefecture-level dataset with 281 Chinese 
cities from 2006–2015. The prefecture-level data is used 
because the land supply decision is made by the munici-
pal government. The timespan of study is from 2006–2015 
given that data on urban investment bonds of the prefec-
ture-level area are only publicly available during this pe-
riod. The prefecture-level data mainly comes from official 
Chinese publications; urban investment debt data comes 
from the China Wind Database. Data on land-leasing rev-
enue and land-leasing scale of prefecture-level cities are 
from China Land and Resources Statistical Yearbooks 
(2007–2016); values for prefecture-level cities’ GDP, built-
up area, fiscal revenue, and the total population come 
from the China City Statistical Yearbooks.
Figure 2. Debt burden risk at prefecture-level in 2009 Figure 3. Debt burden risk at prefecture-level in 2015
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2.2.2. Independent variables
Land-leasing revenue (L.landrevenue): the land-leasing 
revenue of different prefecture- level cities is measured by 
the proportion of land-leasing revenue to their GDP. Data 
are from Land and Resources Statistical Yearbooks and 
China City Statistical Yearbooks. To alleviate the endog-
enous problem, it is lagged by one year.
Land-leasing scale (L.landscale): this variable is 
measured by the ratio of the land-leasing scale to the cit-
ies’ built-up areas to reduce the effect of cities’ differences. 
The data are from Statistical Yearbooks of Land and Re-
sources and China City Statistical Yearbooks. To alleviate 
the endogenous problem, it is lagged by one year.
Land financial dependence (L.dependence): this fac-
tor is measured by the ratio of the city’s land-leasing rev-
enue to its fiscal revenue. It may affect the scale of local 
governments’ debt issuance. The data are from Statistical 
Yearbooks of Land and Resources, and China City Statisti-
cal Yearbooks. To alleviate the endogenous problem, it is 
lagged by one year.
Official promotion stress (stress): based on the ex-
isting research, the official promotion stress is measured 
through the ages of the municipal leaders and is repre-
sented as a dummy variable in the econometric model. 
The municipal leaders with ages between 55 and 58 have 
greater promotion pressure, and the variable value is tak-
en 1, otherwise 0. The researchers manually collected the 
data from the information of government websites and 
bulletins.
2.2.3. Control variables
Fiscal Gap (auto): measured by the ratio of the difference 
of financial income and expenditure to the total financial 
income. Similar to the fiscal self-sufficiency rate, Fiscal Gap 
may also affect the cities’ issued scale of urban investment 
bond, and is added to the econometric models as a control 
variable. The data is from China City Statistical Yearbooks.
To test city leaders’ career incentives, we also com-
pile data on the city leaders in office; mainly collect the 
age data of Municipal Party Secretaries from government 
websites and bulletins. China’s basic political system is a 
multi-party cooperation and political consultation system 
under the leadership of the Communist Party of China. 
Government institutions are set up under the leadership 
of the Communist Party of China. When the mayor and 
municipal party secretary have different opinions, the mu-
nicipal party secretary is on the higher power level than 
mayor. So this paper focuses on the municipal party sec-
retary’s promotion stress.
2.2.1. Dependent variable: urban investment bonds risk
The researchers collected the data of LFPs and bonds to 
construct a new database, which contains 2,419 LFPs and 
13,926 urban investment bonds from 2006 to 2015. Based 
on the new database, we analyze the urban investment 
bonds risk. The unit of urban investment bond issuance 
is RMB 100 million, and the unit of debt scale risk ratio 
is the percentage. According to Meng et al. (2011), the 
firm’s performance was measured through three indica-
tors. This paper measures the risk of urban investment 
bonds through four indicators: the probability of issu-
ing debt, total amount of debt, debt scale risk and debt 
burden risk. The probability of issuing debt (debt1) set a 
dummy variable of 0 and 1, if an issue urban investment 
bond, the value is 1, otherwise 0. The total amount of 
debt (debt2) is the scale debt, adding 1 to the logarithmic 
process, or 0 if no debt issuing exists. The debt scale risk 
(risk1) is measured by the proportion of debt issuance 
to GDP. And the debt burden risk (risk2) is the propor-
tion of the issued debt amount to the prefecture-level 
cities’ fiscal revenue. These four indicators represent the 
frequency of issuing debt, the total amount of debt, the 
proportion of debt scale in GDP and the pressure of debt 
repayment, respectively.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of variables
Variable N Mean Standard error Min Max P50
debt1 2830 0.380 0.486 0.000 1.000 0.000
debt2 2830 1.155 1.612 0.000 6.656 0.000
risk1 2806 3.521 9.005 0.000 124.0 0.000
risk2 2825 17.66 42.26 0.000 678.1 0.000
L.landrevenue 2782 0.041 0.035 0.000 0.425 0.032
L.landscale 2830 0.008 0.013 0.000 0.171 0.004
L.dependence 2825 1.803 3.136 0.006 64.66 1.100
stress 2830 0.322 0.467 0.000 1.000 0.000
auto2 2804 1.759 1.907 −0.351 17.40 1.220
Ln.realgdppc 2806 10.07 0.669 7.926 12.85 10.05
Ln.popden 2807 5.711 0.912 1.548 7.882 5.840
Notes: Data on urban investment bonds are collected from China WIND Database. Data on the land-leasing revenue and land-leasing scale of prefec-
ture-level cities are taken from the China Land and Resources Statistical Yearbooks (2007–2016). Data on per capita GDP, population density, and local 
fiscal revenue and expenditure of prefecture-level cities are obtained from the China City Statistical Yearbooks (2007–2016).
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GDP per capita (pcgdp): this variable reflects the level 
of prefecture-level cities’ economic development, and has 
an impact on the issued scale of urban investment bonds. 
It is set as a control variable in the econometric models 
of this study.
Population density (popden): this variable is meas-
ured by the proportion of the cities’ total population to 
their total land area. To control the effects of the popula-
tion size on the urban investment bond issued size, popu-
lation density is added in the econometric models as a 
control variable. To eliminate the impact of price changes, 
all variables measured in the name of currency are con-
verted into actual values discounted by the consumer 
price index (set the value as 1 in 2006). Table 1 exhibits 
the descriptive statistics of each variable where pcgdp and 
popden are logarithmic values of the real data.
3. Econometric model
3.1. Theoretical framework
This section aims to explain the mechanism of local gov-
ernments’ land financing, and analyze the influence re-
lationship among land-leasing behavior, debt issuance 
behavior and officials’ promotion pressure. In order to 
foster local economic, local governments issue urban in-
vestment bonds by land mortgage to obtain funds for city 
construction. The main fund to repay the urban invest-
ment bonds comes from the land-leasing revenue. When 
the land-leasing revenue is insufficient to repay the debt, 
the repayment will be made through local fiscal revenue. 
And the local economic development and infrastructure 
construction determine the promotion of local officials. 
The more promotion stress of the local officials, the more 
local debt they issued. So, debt issuance probability and 
debt risk are affected not only by the land-leasing revenue, 
but also by the officials’ promotion pressure. Premised on 
the finding in the literature of Chen and Kung (2016), we 
hypothesize that local governments’ land-leasing behav-
ior and officials’ promotion stress may increase the local 
governments’ debt issuance scale and debt risk.
To measure the local governments’ debt risk accurate-
ly, we construct two indicators: debt scale risk and debt 
burden risk. Through these two indicators, we aim to find 
out how the land-leasing behavior and officials’ promotion 
pressure affect the local governments’ debt risk. The pro-
motion pressure prompts local officials to issue more debt, 
and more land-leasing revenue is required to repay the 
debt. The more funds are invested in the local economic 
and infrastructure construction, the more probable the of-
ficials get promoted. Local governments’ land financing 
has been caught in a vicious circle. The officials’ promo-
tion stress may be a catalyst, and change the relationship 
of the local governments’ land-leasing behavior and debt 
risk. To illustrate this, we will analyze how the officials’ 
promotion stress increases the local debt risk in the next 
section.
3.2. Model selection
The debt risk is measured by four indicators: the prob-
ability of issuing debt (debt1), the amount of issued debt 
(debt2), the debt scale risk of (risk1), and the debt burden 
risk (risk2). When these four indictors are the explanatory 
variables, we choose the econometric model between the 
fixed-effects and mixed-effects models. Setting the null hy-
pothesis is to support the mixed-effects model, and the al-
ternative hypothesis is to support the fixed-effects model. 
F test, seeing Table 2 shows that the P-values of the four 
models are 0.000, and the null hypothesis is rejected at a 
significance level of 1%, so the results of F test support the 
fixed-effects model.
The Hausman test is done to choose a better one be-
tween a random effects model and a fixed-effects model. 
The null hypothesis is to support a random effects model, 
and the alternative hypothesis is to support a fixed-effects 
model. If the Chi-square statistical value is greater than 
the critical value of 10% reject the null hypothesis and 
accept the alternative hypothesis, that is, a fixed-effects 
model should be used. Otherwise, a random effects model 
should be used. Table 2 displays the results of the Haus-
man test. The P-values of Models 1, 2, and 3 are less than 
0.01, which reject the null hypothesis on the significance 
level of 1%. The P-value of Model 4 is less than 0.05, and 
the null hypothesis will be rejected at a significance level 
of 5%. Therefore, the Hausman test results of the four 
models indicate that the panel fixed-effects model is suit-
able for empirical models.
3.3. Fixed-effects model
On the basis of the analysis of Section 3.2, we construct 
a dual fixed-effects model to analyze the impact of land-
leasing behavior and the officials’ promotion on the risk 
of the urban investment bonds.
First, we test the impact of land-leasing revenue (lan-
drevenue), land-leasing scale (landscale), land financial 
dependence (dependence), and officials’ promotion stress 
(stress) on the risk of urban investment bonds. Equa-
tion (3) tests the effects of the three core independent vari-
ables (land-leasing revenue, land-leasing scale and land 
financial dependence) together with officials’ promotion 
stress on the risk of urban investment bonds. The econo-
metric model is as follows:
yit = b0 + b1landpricei,t–1 + b2landareai,t–1 + 
b3dependencei,t–1 + b4stressit + bxit + ui + ut + eit . (3) 
Table 2. F-test and Hausman test of models
Model debt1 debt2 risk1 risk2
F statistics 2.650 5.650 6.680 3.210
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Chi-Square Statistics 32.130 58.990 49.310 27.730
P-value 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.034
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Second, we consider the effects of the interaction 
terms between the local governments’ land-leasing behav-
ior and the officials’ promotion stress on the risk of urban 
investment bonds. The econometric model is constructed 
as follows:
yit = b0 + b1landpricei,t–1 + b2landareai,t–1 + 
b3dependencei,t–1 + b4stressit + b5landpricei,t–1 ×  
stressit + b6landareai,t–1 × stressit + b7landpricei,t–1 × 
stressit + bxit + ui + ut + eit . (4)
Equation (4) tests the influence of the interaction be-
tween core independent variables and the promotion pres-
sure of officials on the risk of urban investment bonds. In 
Equations (3) and (4), yit is a vector and represents the 
four indicators of urban investment bonds risk: probabil-
ity of issuing debt (debt1), total amount of debt (debt2), 
debt scale risk (risk1), and debt burden of risk (risk2). 
i represents city, and t represents time (year). landpricei,t–1 
is the total land-leasing revenue of city i in the year t–1, 
and landareai,t–1 is the land-leasing scale of city i in the 
year t–1. dependencei,t–1 is the land financial dependence 
of city i in t–1 year. stressit is the dummy variable and rep-
resents the age of municipal leaders of city i in year t. xit is 
the vector of control variables, which may affect the issu-
ing scale of urban investment bonds, including fiscal gap, 
per capita GDP, and population density. ui represents the 
fixed time effects of city i on the risk of urban investment 
bonds. ut represents the time effects on the risk of urban 
investment bonds. eit is the error term.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Benchmark regression analysis
To test our hypothesis that the land-leasing behavior and 
officials’ promotion pressure may increase the local gov-
ernments’ debt risk. We do the regression about the local 
debt risk on land-leasing behavior and officials’ promotion 
stress.
According to the research of Chen and Kung (2016) on 
land leasing revenue and political turnover in county-level 
cities across the country, land leasing revenue and political 
turnover are endogenous. As we stated in subsection 2.2.2, 
the land-leasing revenue is lagged by one year to alleviate 
the endogenous problem. To further confirm there is no 
collinearity, we do the stepwise regression analysis. As we 
add variable step by step, the significance of the regression 
coefficients has no change, and the change of regression 
coefficients value is very small, which can illustrate that 
there is no collinearity among the variables. Main results 
of the stepwise regression are reported in Table 3.
4.1.1. Probability of issuing debt
We first do the regression of the probability of issuing 
debt on the land-leasing behavior and officials’ promotion 
stress. The probability of issuing debt is binary variable, 
so we regress Equation (3) based on the probit model. 
We take the probability of issuing debt as the dependent 
variable (debt1), and consider the land-leasing revenue, 








































































province effect No Yes Yes Yes
year effect No Yes Yes Yes
N 2480 2480 2480 2479
Adj. R2 – 0.6138 0.5965 0.3773
F 86.29 64.75 45.95
Notes: ***, **, and * denote variables that are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The values of t are in parentheses.
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land-leasing scale, and land financial dependence as the 
explanatory variables to obtain corresponding result 
showing in Column (1) of Table 3.
We can find that the land-leasing revenue (L.landrevenue) 
has a positive and significant effect on the probability of is-
suing debt at the 1% level (coefficient value of 4.032). This 
indicates that when the land-leasing revenue increases, the 
local governments are inclined to issue debt (urban invest-
ment bonds). The coefficient of officials’ promotion pres-
sure (stress) is positive and significant (coefficient value of 
0.055), which indicates that the officials’ promotion pres-
sure will promote the issuing probability. The land-leasing 
scale (L.landscale) and land financial dependence have no 
significant effect on the probability of issuing debt.
According to the result of debt1, we also find that the 
effect of fiscal gap on the probability of issuing debt is 
significant and negative (coefficient value of –0.454). That 
is, the increase of fiscal gap reduces the probability of is-
suing debt. The population density positively influences 
the probability of issuing debt, which is significant. This 
indicates that the probability of issuing debt will continue 
to escalate as the population density increases.
4.1.2. Total amount of debt
The dependent variable in Equation (3) is the total 
amount of debt. The empirical result of debt2 is listed in 
column (2) of Table 3. The effect of land-leasing revenue 
(L.landrevenue) on the total amount of debt is positive 
and significant at the 5% level (coefficient value 4.260). It 
indicates that the city with more the land-leasing revenue 
last year tends to issue more new urban investment bonds 
this year. Both the land-leasing scale and land financial 
dependence have no significant effect on the total amount 
of debt, and the coefficient value of the land-leasing scale 
is negative. The empirical result is consistent with the 
regression result of land-leasing revenue on the county’s 
political turnover in Chen and Kung (2016), which find 
that the land price has a significant and positive effect on 
the county’s political turnover, but the land-leasing scale 
(or area) has no significant effect on the political turnover.
The estimation result of debt2 shows that the officials’ 
promotion pressure has a significant and positive effect on 
the total amount of debt issued by prefecture-level cities, 
with the coefficient, 0.193. Given that municipal officials 
with age 55–58 have remarkable promotion pressure they 
are inclined to issue larger-scale urban investment bonds 
to foster local economic development.
4.1.3. Debt scale risk
Debt scale risk (risk1) reflects the debt size of prefecture-
level cities. We take debt scale risk as the dependent vari-
able of Equation (3), considering land-leasing revenue, 
land-leasing scale, and land financial dependence as the ex-
planatory variables. The empirical result of risk1, reported 
in column (3), shows that the effect of land-leasing revenue 
(landrevenue) on debt scale risk is positively significant at 
5% level with coefficient 13.794, which indicates the rise in 
land-leasing revenue in the previous year will increase the 
scale of urban investment bonds. Hence, the debt scale risk 
will increase this year. The land-leasing scale (landscale) 
has significantly negative effect on debt scale risk at a sig-
nificant level of 5% (the coefficient is −42.826), indicating 
that when land-leasing scale increased in the previous year, 
the prefecture-level city tends to reduce the scale of debt 
issuance in this year, thereby will reduce the debt scale risk.
4.1.4. Debt burden risk
Debt burden risk (risk2) is expressed by the ratio of the 
amount of urban investment debt to the city’s fiscal rev-
enue. Considering debt burden risk as the dependent 
variable of Equation (3), we regress debt burden risk on 
land-leasing revenue, land-leasing scale, land financial de-
pendence and officials’ political pressure. The regression 
result is reported in column (4) of Table 3.
The regression result shows that land financial depend-
ence has a significantly positive impact on the debt burden 
risk at the 1% level (coefficient value 1.882). That is, the 
city with high land financial dependence tends to have 
high debt burden risk. From column (4), both officials’ 
promotion pressure and urban per capita GDP have a 
significant and positive effect on local debt burden risk 
at the 1% level. So the city with high officials’ promotion 
pressure, high land financial dependence, and high per 
capita GDP has high debt burden risk. The literature of 
Chen et al. (2017) finds that when the debt scale reaches 
a certain point, its impact on the economy growth will 
turn from positive to negative, so we can’t just assume the 
local governments’ debt risk increases as the debt scale in-
creases. The debt burden risk is more accurate to measure 
the local governments’ debt risk. For the cities with high 
land financial dependence, policy makers should focus on 
the local governments’ debt risk.
4.2. Interaction terms test
As we analyzed in Section 4.1, the officials’ promotion pres-
sure may affect the relationship of the local governments’ 
land-leasing behavior and debt risk. To analyze how the 
officials’ promotion stress increases the local debt risk, 
we construct three interaction terms between the official 
promotion pressure and land-leasing revenue, land-leasing 
scale, land financial dependence, respectively. Including 
these three interaction terms as the explanatory variables in 
Equation (3), we obtain a new econometric – Equation (4).
Based on Equation (4), we analyze the impact of the in-
teraction terms on the total amount of debt issued (debt2), 
debt scale risk (risk1), and debt burden risk (risk2). The 
regression result is reported in Table 4.
4.2.1. Impact of interaction terms on total amount of 
debt issued
Table 4 shows the empirical results included the interac-
tion term. Column (1) shows that the interaction term of 
land-leasing revenue and officials’ promotion pressure has 
a positive effect on the total amount of debt issued (debt2), 
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and the estimated coefficient is significant at 5% level with 
an estimate of 3.450. According to the empirical results 
of the benchmark regression, land-leasing revenue posi-
tively affects total amount of debt issued. This indicates 
that the officials’ promotion pressure enlarges the positive 
effect of land-leasing revenue on the local governments’ 
debt risk. For the cities with high officials’ promotion pres-
sure, the officials are inclined to get more revenue from 
land-leasing, which leads to larger scale urban investment 
bonds (debt2).
Column (2) shows that the interaction term of the land 
financial dependence and officials’ promotion stress has 
a positive effect on the debt2. But from the result of the 
benchmark regression (column (1) of Table 3), the land 
financial dependence has no significant effect on debt2. So 
we cannot use the result of this interaction term to analyze 
debt2, though its regression coefficient is significant.
4.2.2. Impact of interaction terms on debt scale risk
To test effect of officials’ promotion pressure on debt scale 
risk, we choose debt scale risk (risk1) as the dependent 
variable in Equation (4). Columns (3) and (4) in Table 4 
reported the regression result. The three interaction terms 
all have a significant effect on local debt risk. The interac-
tion term between land-leasing revenue and official pro-
motion pressure has a positively significant effect on the 
land scale risk at the 1% level (coefficient value 41.951). 
The interaction term between the land-leasing scale and 
official promotion pressure has a negative and significant 
effect on the land scale risk at the 5% level (coefficient val-
ue –0.272). The interaction term of land financial depen-
dence and official promotion pressure (dependence*stress) 
negatively affects land scale risk at the 5% of significance 
level (coefficient value 26.970).
From the result in column (4), the land-leasing scale 
has a negative and significant effect on the debt scale risk. 
This indicates that the increase of land-leasing area can 
reduce the debt scale risk. However, the interaction term 
(landscale*stress) have a negative significant effect on the 
local debt scale risk. That is, the officials’ promotion pres-
sure will reduce the negative effect of land-leasing scale on 
the debt scale risk, and increase the debt scale risk.
From the benchmark analysis result, the land-leasing 
revenue has a positive and significant effect on the debt 
scale risk. The interaction term (landrevenue*stress) has a 
positively significant effect on the debt scale risk, which 
Table 4. Impact of interaction items on the debt scale and debt risk
Model
debt2 risk1 risk2

























































































































province effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2481 2480 2481 2480 2479 2479
Adj. R2 0.6145 0.6143 0.6009 0.6017 0.3792 0.3791
F 81.35 72.36 62.92 56.37 43.69 38.91
Notes: ***, **, and * denote variables that are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The values of t are in parentheses.
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(3) The officials’ promotion pressure has a positive ef-
fect on the four indicators of the local governments’ debt-
issuing behavior. This indicates the officials’ promotion 
pressure is the key factor to affect the local governments’ 
debt-issuing behavior. Higher officials’ promotion pres-
sure not only increases the debt-issuing probability and 
total amount of the debt issued, but also enlarges the debt 
scale risk and the debt burden risk.
Meanwhile, from the empirical analysis of the interac-
tion terms, we can get:
(1) Both land-leasing revenue and its interaction term 
have a positive effect on the total amount of debt issued. 
This indicates that the officials’ promotion pressure enlarges 
the positive effect of land-leasing revenue on the local gov-
ernments’ debt risk. For the city with high officials’ promo-
tion pressure, its total amount of debt issued is large.
(2) The interaction term of land-leasing scale and of-
ficials’ promotion pressure has a negative effect on local 
debt scale risk, while the interaction term of land-leasing 
revenue and officials’ promotion pressure has a positive 
effect on local debt scale risk. This illustrates that the of-
ficials’ promotion pressure reduces the negative effect of 
land-leasing scale on debt scale risk, and enlarges the posi-
tive effect of land-leasing revenue on debt scale risk. For 
the cities with high promotion stress, when land-leasing 
scale and land-leasing revenue increase, we should focus 
on the city’s debt scale risk.
(3) Both land financial dependence and its interaction 
term have a positive effect on debt burden risk. Since the debt 
burden risk is a more accurate indicator to measure the local 
governments’ debt risk than the debt scale risk. For the city 
with high land financial dependence and high promotion 
pressure, policy makers should focus on its high debt risk.
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